Ripstein’s, “Beyond the Harm Principle”

Type 1

In, “Beyond the Harm Principle,” Arthur Ripstein begins by critiquing Mill on his argument of the Harm Principle as a ground for criminalization. For Ripstein, what matters most is individual sovereignty which cannot be achieved until the the harm principle is abandoned. In order to achieve this there must be an alternative, which is when Ripstein proposes his argument for the Sovereign Principle. The sovereign principle focuses on individual liberty and freedom, and it “provides a narrow rationale for the legitimate use of state power” (pg 215). Therefore, according to Ripstein, violations of equal freedom is the better basis for criminalization.

Ripstein critiques the harm principle on the grounds that it fails to explain why harm truly matters and how it is relevant to criminal law. In addition to this, he states that the harm principles criminalizes market competition, which in result limits individual freedom. He continues on to say that anyone who loves freedom should be uncomfortable with the harm principle, since it tends to limit liberties. He reinforces a the liberal idea that one cannot be criminalized against for the actions of another, which tends to happen with the harm principle. Ripstein introduces Feinberg’s idea of “fair contests” that the harm principle criminalizes. The example he uses is if someone builds a better mousetrap than you; this cannot be prohibited even when it may cause harm to you, because it limits another’s freedom.

The main idea of the sovereign principle is to express that the only reason to criminalize people is when their freedoms are being deprived. He argues that everyone is allowed to pursue their own purposes through equal freedom, and sovereignty allows independence to do what one pleases, as long as it does not interfere with another’s liberties.

Ripstein, A. (2006). Beyond the Harm Principle. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34(3), 215–245. Retrieved September 8, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876391.